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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes is reported to have said, "Lawyers spend a great deal 
of their time shoveling smoke". The Appellees' 22 page statement of facts, coupled with 22 
pages of facts improperly placed in it's "Addenda A" create a billow of smoke but no 
substantive justification for entry of the disconnection decree for the following plain, 
compelling reasons: first, whether the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law. Application of the plain statutory language shows that Appellees' 
jurisdiction argument is frivolous. Second, whether private property owners can use the 
disconnection and annexation statutes to change a common boundary between two cities is 
determined by a construction of the statutes at issue. Third, whether the proposed 
disconnection creates a prohibited peninsula of unincorporated territory simply requires the 
application of the mathematical formula contained in the statute to the land at issue. Fourth, 
the undisputed facts in this case create legal principles demonstrating that the lower court 
misapplied the justice and equity disconnection standard. Lastly, Bluff dale's disciplined 
marshaling of the material undisputed facts, showed that two of the lower court's rulings 
were each clearly erroneous. Bluff dale Qty respectfully submits this reply brief. 
ARGUMENT 
P< >ll^  IT I . ' -
APPELLEES' ARGUMENT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION EVEN THOUGH THE INITIAL JUDICIAL 
PETITION WAS SIGNED BY TWO AND ONLY TWO PROPERTY OWNERS IS 
FRIVOLOUS. 
A frivolous argument is not grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. Gf. Rule 33(b)("a frivolous ... 
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paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law or not based on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law"). The notion that the lower 
court had jurisdiction even though the judicial petition "challenging the municipal legislative 
body's determination" was not filed by "petitioners" as the term is statutorily defined, or by 
those designated to act on their behalf is plainly frivolous. 
A. The Appellees' Argument Is Not Grounded in Fact Only Two Property 
Owners Brought the Initial Judicial Petition for Disconnection. 
The jurisdictional issue is not as Appellees misstate, whether owners of more than 
50% of the area at issue support the disconnection.1 The issue is whether the judicial 
petition challenging the Gty's denial of disconnection was brought by those required by the 
disconnection statute. It is undisputed the initial judicial petition seeking to invoke 
jurisdiction was brought by only two of the 52 property owners who filed the request for 
disconnection with Bluffdale Gty. Likewise, it is undisputed the judicial petition was not 
brought by anyone designated by the petitioners pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
502(2)(a)(iv), to act on their behalf.2 Don Wallace, Robert Jones and Loretta Wilcox were 
not parties to and did not file the judicial petition. Lastly, it is undisputed the two filing 
property owners only own approximately 31% of the land at issue. 
B. The Appellees' Argument is Not Warranted by Existing Law. The 
Disconnection Statute Clearly Limits a Judicial Challenge of a City 
Disconnection Denial to "Petitioners" or Those Persons Statutorily 
Designated to Act on the Petitioners Behalf. 
1
 See Developers' Brief p. 38:6. 
2
 Donald Wallace, Robert Jones, and Loretta Wilcox were designated as petitioner's 
representatives, in Plaintiffs' Ex's 90, 91, and 92. 
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The disconnection statute allows a challenge of a municipal disconnection decision 
only if the challenge is brought by the "(i) petitioners or (ii) the county...." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-2-502(5)(a). The county did not file a judicial challenge. Likewise, the "petitioners" 
didn't either. "Petitioners" are defined by Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-501(1). It "means 
persons who: (a) own title to real property within the area proposed for disconnection and 
(b) have signed a request for disconnection proposing to disconnect that area from the 
municipality"'. Id Noteworthy and suggesting that "petitioners" refers to all the property 
owners who filed the request for disconnection is that the legislature defined the term 
"petitioners" not "petitioner" a singular form. 
Once the petitioners are defined and assembled as persons who own property and 
signed a request for disconnection of a proposed area, the statute empowers the petitioners 
to act as a group or through their statutorily designated representatives. First, the petitioners 
proposing to disconnect file "a request for disconnection". Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
501(2)(a). The petitioners do not file individual requests or more than one request. Second, 
the petitioners must own more than 50% of the area at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
501(2)(b)(i). Third is the requirement to designate between one and five persons "to act on 
the petitioners behalf in the proceedings". If the petitioners could proceed individually there 
would not be a statutory requirement to designate those "with authority to act on the 
petitioners behalf". The petitioners next provide notice of the request for disconnection, 
not requests for disconnection. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502(3). After a decision by the city, 
the "petitioners" may challenge the disconnection denial by filing a judicial petition. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(a)(i). 
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In summary, from the beginning of the disconnection process, up to and including 
the filing of the judicial petition challenging the Gty*s disconnection decision, petitioners are 
defined and treated as the persons who own property in the area proposed for disconnection 
and who signed the request for disconnection. 
Moreover, that the statute clearly defines petitioners as a group and empowers them 
to act as a group is also shown by what the Legislature did not insert into the statute. An 
example is the omission of the word "those" before persons in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
501(1). "Those" is used to indicate an unspecified number. If an unspecified number of 
property owners could challenge a municipal disconnection decision, the legislature would 
have used the word "those". Likewise if the Legislature intended less than petitioners who 
signed the request for disconnection to seek judicial review, it could have inserted a number 
or even the word "some" before the word petitioners in § 10-2-502(5)(a). The Legislature's 
decision not to modify "persons" in § 10-2-501(1) or the word "petitioners" in § 10-2-
502.5(a)(i) shows that only the petitioners, the property owners who signed the request for 
disconnection can judicially challenge the city's denial of the request. 
C 100% of All Utah Cases Dealing with the Issue of Whether Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction Exists When A Judicial Petition Seeking a Disconnection Decree 
Is Not Brought by Those Specified and Required in the Disconnection Statute 
Have Uniformly Held That Subject Matter Jurisdiction Does Not Exist 
As set forth in Point I of the Argument section of Bluff dale's opening brief, Howtrdv 
Toim cf North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 181, 281 P.2d 216 (1955); South Jordan Gtyv Sandy City (In 
w Sandy City), 870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994); and Marimvnt v White City Water Irrpmuernent Dist, 
958 P.2d 765 (Utah 1998) uniformly hold that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist and 
dismissal is required when a judicial petition for disconnection is not brought by those 
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specified in the applicable disconnection statute. There is no contrary Utah case law, and the 
Appellees cite to none. 
D. The Appellees' Have Not Presented A Good Faith Argument For Modifying or 
Reversing Existing Law. 
The Appellees mischaracterize Howrd v Town cf North Salt Lake, the seminal and 
dispositive disconnection case. The dispositive issue in Haimrd, was not notice or lack of 
notice. The dispositive issue was the Legislature's authority to establish the process for 
changing municipal boundaries: 
"the changing of the territory limits of a city is primarily a 
legislative function, courts are bound to confine the exercise of 
the power confirmed upon them by the Legislature within the 
expressed or necessarily implied language of the act so 
conferring the power. 
The filing of the [disconnection] petition vested the court with 
jurisdiction to take evidence and determine if the prerequisite 
conditions necessary to give the court jurisdiction to consider 
the merits of the question had been met. 
The prerequisite was the signing and filing of the petition by a 
majority of the real property owners in the territory within and 
lying upon the borders of the towns sought for 
disconnection". 
#** 
Before the court can pass upon the justice and equity of the 
matter, it must first determine judicially the existence of the 
requisites fixed by the Legislature. 
Id at 219. 
Since the petition was not signed by those required by the statute, the Hauurd Court 
held "the trial court never acquired jurisdiction to make the order of disconnection". Id at 
220. The court also explained "An existing suit within the Court's jurisdiction is a 
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prerequisite to intervention. Intervention cannot give life to a lawsuit which does not 
actually exist nor can it create jurisdiction where no jurisdiction exists". Id at 218. 
Likewise, Mariemmt v White City Water Irrprmenmt District and South Jordan City v Sandy 
City Corp., plainly held that the time for determining whether jurisdiction exists is when the 
judicial petition for disconnection is filed with die district court and that if the statutory 
prerequisites for bringing a judicial petition are not met, the court has no power other than 
to dismiss the judicial petition. 
Application of the foregoing rock-solid holdings requires a dismissal of the Appellees' 
judicial petition. Consequently, they argue that because more than 50% of the property 
owners filed an amended petition, the court should reject the holdings. Such an approach 
requires the wholesale denial of the reasoning in Hoimrd and the cases following it. Fixing 
municipal boundaries would no longer be primarily a legislative function. Instead, the courts 
would intrude upon the power of the Legislature to fix and change municipal boundaries. 
Further, the Appellees' 50% property argument misstates the issue for review. The issue is 
not whether the majority of the property owners, the owners of the majority of the lands or 
a majority of the voters now favor or eventually seek disconnection. The issue is simply 
whether the legislative prerequisites for subject matter jurisdiction were met at the time the 
judicial petition for disconnection was filed. They were not. 
Next, the Appellees argue that because the first step in the disconnection process, the 
filing of a request for disconnection with the City was met, the lower court acquired subject 
matter jurisdiction. This argument focuses on the step requiring city processing of the 
request for disconnection and ignores the step required to invoke judicial review, "a petition 
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against the municipality challenging the municipal legislative body's determination ... filed in 
district court by: (i) petitioners". Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a)(i). As set forth above, 
the time for determining jurisdiction, is when the pleading seeking judicial review is filed. 
The disconnection process for judicial review is similar to the judicial review process 
for challenging municipal land use decisions, or for challenging administrative agency 
decisions. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-801, 63-46b-15, and 63-46b-16. In no event, does 
subject matter jurisdiction ever exist until a pleading is filed with the district court after the 
municipal or administrative decision is finally made. See generally, Parkdale Care Ctr. v 
Frandsen, 837 P.d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1992); McCoy v Utah Disaster Kkemp, 2003 UT App. 
49,65 P.3d 643 (Utah 2003). 
Lastly, the Appellees' argument that a "logistical nightmare" will occur if the 
disconnection statute is plainly applied is nonsense. First, it's not too much to ask those 
who filed the disconnection request with the Qty, be required to be parties to a lawsuit 
challenging the Ckfs denial (at least, up and to the point where the petitioners own more 
than 50% of the land at issue). More importantly, clearly there is no logistical nightmare 
because the statute explicitly directs the petitioners to designate one to five individuals to act 
on the petitioners behalf. See Utah Code Ann. §10-2-501(2)(b)(iv). Those designated by the 
petitioners in the case at bar, could have but did not file a judicial petition challenging the 
City's disconnection decision. 
In summary, the Appellees' jurisdiction argument is not grounded in fact or law, and 
does not contain a good faith argument for modifying, or reversing existing law. The 
argument is frivolous. 
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POINT II 
AS AMATTER OF LAWTHE PROPOSED DISCONNECTION CREATES OR 
LEAVES A PROHIBITED PENINSULA 
Whether a "Peninsula" of unincorporated territory was created as a result of the 
disconnection in this case is solely an issue of law. The lower court's misinterpretation of 
the statutory definition of "Peninsula" as used in the Disconnection Statute, and the lower 
court's application of that definition, completely eliminated the statutory prohibition of a 
disconnection creating a "Peninsula of unincorporated territory." Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
502.7(3) (c)(iii). In fact, once the lower court rendered its misinterpretation of this provision 
of the disconnection statute it was impossible to find that there would ever be a "Peninsula" 
in Salt Lake County or throughout the State of Utah. The lower court recognized this 
consequence stating: "In reality, unless other boundaries are utilized, the very definition 
which was created by the legislature makes the existence of a peninsula impossible . . . " Id. at 
& 1192-1193. The lower court never attempted to harmonize the definition of Peninsula 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6) and the intended application of that definition 
enacted in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502(3)(c)(iii). 
The statutory definition of "Peninsula" applicable to the disconnection statute, § 10-
1-104(6) creates a two-prong test for finding a "Peninsula." First, "an area surrounded on 
more than half of its boundary distance, but not completed, by incorporated territory." 
Secondly, "the length of a line drawn across the unincorporated area from an incorporated 
area to an incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total 
aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area. In applying that test without the limitation 
of § 502.7(3)(c)(iii), the lower court's legal conclusion upon which it rested its opinion was: 
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"In the Court's view, call contiguous unincorporated areas must be considered in making the 
calculation.'" Findings of Fact and Memorandum Decision, at & 1192. Based on this 
interpretation of the statute, as to the first-prong the lower court found that: "The 
unincorporated area which is left or created is essentially infinite," explaining its reasoning as 
"[t]he newly created unincorporated area would join other bordering unincorporated areas in 
Salt Lake County, which in turn borders unincorporated areas in other counties throughout 
the states." Id. at R. 1192. Under the lower court's interpretation of the statute, there could 
never be a "Peninsula." 
As to the second prong of the test, the lower court, under the heading, "The 25% test 
as interpreted by the Qty renders the statute vague," explained that "it is not necessary to 
make the second calculation". It claimed that "if the term 'unincorporated area' were limited 
to the newly disconnected areas as the Qty proposes, the statute is rendered too vague to 
apply." Id. at & 1193. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that the appellate court reviews for 
correctness. See Stephens v Bonneville, Travel Incy 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). See also ARIS 
Vision Institute, Inc v Wasatch Properties Management, Inc, 143 P.3d 278 (Utah 2006). An appeal 
to determine whether a lower court's interpretation of a statute is correct is not an issue of 
fact but a question of law. Marshaling the evidence would be no value to this, the reviewing 
court. As the lower court clearly stated, based on its interpretation of the second prong: "In 
this case, this difficulty was illustrated quite clearly at trial as counsel for both parties were 
able to draw lines from one portion of incorporated territory to a point "opposite" to 
support their position." And, as to the first prong, as stated above, the lower court found 
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that based on its interpretation "the very definition which was created by the legislature 
makes the existence of a peninsula impossible/' & 1295 at 1193. 
The issue before this Court is whether the lower court's interpretation of the 
statutory definition of "Peninsula" as this definition was applied to the prohibition of the 
disconnection creating a peninsula, was correct. Further, "When reviewing legal 
determinations, an "appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any 
degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State v Brvoks, 902 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 
1995). 
It is hornbook law, certainly within the jurisdiction of this Court: When interpreting 
statutes, the primary goal of a court should be to give effect to the legislature's intent as set 
forth in the statute's plain language: 
[OJur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language in light of 
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Anderson 
Deidopmznt Ca v Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 336 (Utah 2005). 
Quoting Calhoun v State FarmMutual, 96 P.3d 916 (Utah 2004). 
But, as this Court has noted, the meaning and intent of the legislature cannot be ascertained 
by reviewing the provision in "isolation," it must be considered in light of the statute as a 
whole: 
[W]hen deciding questions of statutory interpretation, we do not 
look to language in isolation. Rather, we look first to the 
statute's plain language, in relation to the statute as a whole to 
determine its meaning. 
Tobias, at 335. This is especially important in this instance as interpreting the definition of 
"Peninsula" in isolation renders it susceptible to an interpretation that completely writes the 
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prohibition of creating a peninsula out of the prohibitions enacted in § 10-2-5027(3)(c), as, 
in fact, the lower court's interpretation of the prohibition admittedly does. 
When a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, it is the court's duty to 
make it harmonize as a whole and to interpret the statute in light of reason and common 
sense. This the lower court did not do. The lower court appears only to have found an 
interpretation of the definition provision of § 10-1-104(6) that renders it ambiguous or 
ludicrous and which ignores other consistent interpretations and the limitations on the 
definition imposed by subsection 10-2-502.7(3) (c)(iii). 
The lower court's interpretation rendered the size of the peninsula to be infinite. 
That surely was not the legislative intent. The legislature intended to prohibit a 
disconnection to create two forms of unincorporated territory within an area of incorporated 
territory; one, the island, £e, an area of unincorporated territory completely surrounded by 
incorporated territory, and a "peninsula," an area of unincorporated territory more than 50% 
surrounded by incorporated territory but not completely. 
The lower court's interpretation of the first prong, also according to its own analysis 
"making the existence of a peninsula impossible, because of necessity, every "peninsula" 
with measurable boundaries will also be an "island." R. 1193. This interpretation gives no 
effect to the legislative intent, or to the stated legislative purpose. The error of the lower 
court was in its failure to read the statute as a whole, to read the definition of "Peninsula" in 
pari rmteria with the prohibition against peninsulas. In deciding questions of statutory 
interpretation, a court "should not view the language in isolation." Rather, a court "must 
view the language of the statute in question in relation to the statute as a whole to determine 
11 
its meaning." Tobias, 116 P.3d 325. 
In interpreting the statute the lower court also ignores the operative language of the 
Disconnection Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7. § 10-2-502.7 merely defines the term 
"Peninsula" for Chapter 2 of the Utah Code. Its application must be interpreted in light of 
its use. § 10-2-502.7(3) (c)(iii) states the definition's purpose, and provides that a territory 
cannot be disconnected if the proposed disconnection will leave or "create one or more 
islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory." (Emphasis added). The focus of the 
entire statute is on the unincorporated area that is created by the proposed disconnection, 
not the "infinite" unincorporated territory found by the lower court to exist throughout the 
State of Utah. The lower court recognized the absurdity of its interpretation and even 
explained what was needed to correct it. "In reality, unless other boundaries are utilized, 
the very definition which was created by the legislature makes the existence of a peninsula 
impossible. . . . " & 1192-93. (Emphasis added). Other boundaries were intended to be 
utilized, Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) statutorily supplies the other boundaries, 
that the lower court thought were missing. These "other boundaries" of the prohibition 
subsection 502.7(3)(c)(iii) are mandated to be used if the provisions are to be read in 
harmony and in accord with the manifest intent of the legislature. The area which may not 
be a "Peninsula" is the area of the "proposed disconnection." § 502.7(3)(c). Thus, the other 
boundary, and the boundary that must be used to calculate the "total aggregate boundaries 
of the unincorporated area" is the boundary between the existing unincorporated territory 
and the newly created unincorporated territory. 
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If the portions of § 502.7(3)(c) that are relevant to the prohibition of a peninsula are 
read together the legislative intent is clear. 
3. The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence: . . . (c) that the proposed 
disconnection will not: . . . (iii) . . . create one or more . . . 
peninsulas of unincorporated territory.... 
The definition of "Peninsula" in Section 10-1-104(6) applies only to the unincorporated 
territory crated by the proposed disconnection. If the rule of in pari materia is applied this is 
the consequence and effect that is given to each provision, section and subsection of the act 
as the Legislature intended and statutory interpretation requires. 
Even under the "historical usage" of the word, "peninsula" which the lower court 
claims to have examined in rendering its interpretation, (K 1194), the unincorporated area 
created by the disconnection is a "peninsula." The American Heritage Action Dictionary, 
Third Edition 1996 that the lower court relied on defines "peninsula" as, "[a] piece of land 
that projects into a body of water and is connected with the mainland by an isthmus." 
Hence, the area of Florida surrounded by water is a "peninsula" even though it is connected 
to a larger land mass sometimes referred to as North America, without a narrow isthmus. 
The fact that the territory known as Florida is connected to like territory, Florida mainland, 
also does not disqualify the rest of Florida as a "peninsula." 
Likewise, the unincorporated area known as the "area of disconnection" being 
connected to similar unincorporated territory, known as unincorporated Salt Lake County or 
unincorporated Utah is also a "Peninsula." "Looking at Plaintiff Developers' Trial Ex. 213, 
(See Addendum "A") clearly shows the "Peninsula." The darker purple area of the graphic 
is the "unincorporated territory5 created by the disconnection. The lower court opined that 
13 
if the area created by the disconnection was connected with the main mass of 
"unincorporated land," ie unincorporated Salt Lake County by a "narrow neck" of 
unincorporated land, "it would be possible to apply the definition given by the statute to that 
land with more confidence."3 & at 1194. The lower court did not examine other Mertiam-
Webster Dictionary definitions. If it had, it would have found that a "narrow neck" of 
connecting land, "an isthmus," is not required to form a peninsula. See eg, Eleventh 
Edition, 2003. 
In interpreting legislation, where the statute is subject to more than one construction, 
one rendering the statute senseless and clearly unreflective of the legislative intent: and the 
other construction giving sense to the statute and reflective of the legislative purpose, a court 
must accept the interpretation that makes sense and sustain it. See State v Moore, 521 P.2d 
556, 560 (Utah 1974). 
Believing that the lack of a "narrow neckf' of unincorporated territory was fatal, the 
lower court next claimed to have examined the "historic use of the word." In this regard the 
lower court ignored the Peninsula prohibition of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii), and 
addressed instead the requirements of § 10-2-502.7(4), as a substitute: This subsection 
provides in part: "In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with 
respect to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i) and (ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, 
including the effect of the proposed disconnection on:. . . . " In this regard the lower court 
concluded that: "[t]he ability of these two municipalities to provide services to their citizens 
would not in any way be impacted by the presence of this unincorporated section of land." 
irThe lower court could have just as easily found that the lack of surrounding water defeated 
finding that the disconnected area is a peninsula. 
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It should be noted by the absence of § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) from the applicability of a § 10-
2-502.7(4) investigation, finding that the Legislature expressly excluded the prohibition 
against peninsulas of § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). In this last analysis, the lower court found that 
the disconnection would not violate the prohibitions of § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii): "Based upon 
these historic factors, the Court finds that no peninsula here exists." Id. at R. 1195. 
Although it is an interesting conclusion, satisfying the conditions of § 10-2-502.7(4) 
only demonstrates that the petitioners satisfied the conditions of § 10-2- 502.7(3) (c)(i) and 
(ii). Such a determination will not satisfy the prohibitions of § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). Further, 
§ 10-2-502.7(4) intentionally, by its absence, prohibits the lower court from using the factors 
of § 10-2-502.7(4) to support a finding that the disconnection will not violate the prohibition 
against "islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory7' in § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). 
Petitioners argue that Bluffdale has failed to "Marshal the Evidence." Marshaling 
requires an appellant that is challenging the factual findings to present the factual evidence 
that supports the lower court's findings. Since the lower court misinterpreted the statute and 
relied on facts that were not relevant to the legislative intent, there are no additional facts to 
marshal See, Jensens Saw^m.y 2005 UT 81,1115, 130 P.3d 325, 33 Media L. Rep. 2578, 539 
(Utah 2005). 
POINT III 
A FOCUSED REVIEW OF UTAH CODE ANN, § 10-2-419 AND § 10-2-510 
PLAINLY SHOWS THAT THE STATUTORY PROCESS CANNOT BE USED 
TO CHANGE THE BOUNDARIES OF TWO ADJOINING CITIES. 
The municipal boundary statutes at issue do not authorize what the Appellees seek, 
take land out of one city and develop it in an adjacent city. The Appellees argue that Utah 
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Code Ann. § 10-2-419 applies only to municipalities, not private property owners. 
Consequently they say the legislature meant to only preclude municipalities, not property 
owners from utilizing Part 5 of Title 10, the disconnection process.4 
The first problem with the Appellees" argument is that no annexation or 
disconnection statute authorizes private property owners to change a boundary between 
adjoining cities. First, the annexation statute La Part 4 of Chapter 2, Title 10 prohibits 
annexing incorporated or municipal lands into a municipality, only unincorporated lands can 
be annexed. See, eg Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-401(1) (b) ("annexation petition means a 
petition ... proposing the annexation to a municipality of ... unincorporated area"); 10-2-
401(1)(d)("expansion area means the unincorporated area ... identified in an annexation 
policy plan"); 10-2-401.5 ("no municipality may annex an unincorporated area within a 
specified county unless ..."); 10-2-402(l)(a)("a contiguous unincorporated area...may be 
annexed ... ."); 10-2-402(1)(b) ("unincorporated area may not be annexed ... municipality 
unless"); 10-2-403("the process to annex an unincorporated area to a municipality is initiated 
by petition"); and 10-2-406(1)(a)(1)("notice ... within the unincorporated area"). Likewise, 
the disconnection statute Part 5 of Chapter 2, Title 10 does not allow incorporated land 
within a city to be disconnected into another city. Instead the disconnected land becomes 
unincorporated land to be serviced by the county. Stated another way, cities other than the 
city with land proposed for disconnection have nothing to do with the process. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-2-502.5(2) (municipal legislative body shall provide notice ... to the 
legislative body of the county"); 10-2-502.5(5)(a)("a petition challenging the municipal 
4
 See Brief of Appellees, p. 42. 
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legislative body's [disconnection] determination ... may be filed in district court ... (ii) the 
county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located"); and 10-2-502.7(3) (d) ("that 
the county ... is capable ... of providing municipal services ... to the area ... that the 
municipality will no longer provide due to the disconnection"). 
In summary, it is correct as the Appellees say that Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-419 
allows cities to change a common boundary with consensual resolutions and that 10-2-510 
prohibits the cities doing it any other way. It is not correct to suggest that property owners 
have any right to change a boundary common between two cities. Neither the annexation 
nor the disconnection statute provides such a right. 
The second mistake in the Appellees' argument is that it overlooks the plain subject 
matter of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-419 and 10-2-510. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419 is the 
only statute that deals with changing a boundary common to "two or more municipalities". 
See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419(1) (annexation of land "taken" from one municipality and 
"proposed for annexation" to the [other municipality]. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-
419(2)(b)(v)(B) and (2)(b)(vi). Further § 10-2-510 plainly provides "this part" [Part 5 
Restriction of Municipal Limits] shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or replace the 
procedure provided in section 10-2-419. Accordingly, there is only one way to change a 
common boundary between two adjoining cities. That one way provided by the Legislature 
is set forth in §10-2-419. 
Lastly, the Appellees failed to address the "constant jockeying of 
disconnection/annexation" that can undermine forever the fixing of municipal boundaries if 
the Appellees' argument is accepted by this Court. Plainly, as this Court recognized in 
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Chevron USA. v North Salt Lake, 711 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah 1985), the Legislature has a clear 
interest in precluding its disconnection and annexation statutes from being construed to 
allow such a result. 
POINT IV 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE LOWER COURT 
MISAPPLIED THE JUSTICE AND EQUITY STANDARD. NO ADDITIONAL 
MARSHALING IS REQUIRED. 
A. Introduction. 
It is incorrect to treat the Justice and Equity standard as a pure question of fact as the 
Appellees do. Instead, "the general determination of what constitutes justice and equity 
warranting a disconnection turns on the facts of the case, under well recognized principles of 
law". In re ChufConsol. Mining Ca, 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044 (1928). The lower court's 
conclusion that justice and equity required disconnection5 was based on three facts: (1) 
Bluffdale citizens availed themselves of the referendum process; (2) Bluffdale's zoning and 
planning process was characterized by unnecessary delays and changing standards; and (3) 
undeveloped land is historically appropriate for disconnection. The Appellees offer no 
additional justification for the lower court's justice and equity determination. Bluffdale 
replies that the marshaled determinative facts undermine the lower court's ruling and show 
that the lower court committed legal error. 
1. The Referendum. 
There is no dispute that Bluffdale citizens temporarily blocked, by filing a 
referendum, a zoning ordinance designed to appease the petitioners. But it is also 
5
 Actually the Court said justice and equity "favored" disconnection. See R. 1185. 
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undisputed that only one referendum petition was ever successfully filed, and that once the 
Bluffdale voters approved the zoning ordinance, the developers refused to seek its 
application to their lands. See Bluff dale's Motion to Supplement the Record. More 
importantly, Bluffdale argued in its opening brief, as a matter of law to protect the citizens' 
constitutional and statutory rights to use the referendum process requires that the existence 
of a referendum not be used as a factor in determining whether justice and equity require a 
disconnection. The Appellees' argument that just because Utah courts have never 
considered the referendum process as a justice and equity factor does not mean the courts 
cannot do so now, does not address the legal argument in a meaningful way. 
2. Delays and Changing Standards. 
Three undisputed facts show that delay and changing standards did not create the 
justice and equity requiring a disconnection. First, the delay was comparable to the delay 
that occurred for South Farm's sister project outside of Bluffdale. Second, until the 
proposed consent decree was negotiated, South Farm continually proposed 2.8 density 
zoning. It was South Farm's way or the highway. Third, all changes in standards were made 
to accommodate South Farm, LLC Because these three facts are determinative, Bluffdale 
did not, as the Appellees allege, fail to marshal the evidence on delays and changing 
standards. Cf. Heglar Ranch, Inc v Stillrmn, 619 P.2d 1390, 1392 (Utah 1980) (summary 
judgment is not precluded simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted). 
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3. Undeveloped Land. 
No one disputes the land at issue is mostly undeveloped. All that exists is one home 
and a large water treatment plant on the nearly 4,000 acres. Depositve, however, is that the 
land is immediately developable and unlike all other undeveloped lands considered in Utah 
disconnection cases, requires substantial municipal services. Bluffdale is not asking for its 
cake and eating it too as the Appellees mistakenly suggest. Rather, Bluffdale is pointing out 
that the land at issue is not the kind of land that historically justifies a disconnection. 
B. Three Additional Undisputed Facts Demonstrate That The Lower Court 
Misapplied the Justice and Equity Standard. Consequently, No Additional 
Marshaling is Required on The Justice and Equity Issue. 
Three additional undisputed facts, which the Appellees fail to meaningfully discuss, 
conclusively show that the lower court misapplied the justice and equity standard. Stated 
another way, three undisputed facts trigger recognized principles of law precluding a 
determination that justice and equity required a disconnection. First, the Appellees fail to 
address the remedies identified on page 43 of Bluffdale's opening brief (short of a 
disconnection) that were available to them to address Bluffdale's land use process and 
decisions. It is hornbook law that equity does not require anything if other legal remedies 
are available to the litigant. E.g. Erisrmnv Owrrun, 358 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1961). Second, 
the parties stipulated that the land use decision triggering the disconnection was not 
appealed because an appeal would be futile, La South Farm could not show that the Gt / s 
actions were not reasonably debatable. Lastly, it is undisputed that the parties to this dispute 
resolved all their issues by presenting a proposed consent decree to the lower court. It is 
axiomatic that if justice does not require: (1) a reversal on appeal of the Ckfs land use 
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decisions and proceedings upon which the disconnection is based; (2) or the entry of a 
consent decree giving the property owners essentially what they wanted, justice does not 
require the more extreme remedy of a disconnection. 
POINT V 
BLUFFDALE'S DISCIPLINED MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE 
DISCONNECTION VIABILITY AND INCREASED COSTS TO BLUFFDALE 
ISSUES SHOWED THAT THE LOWER COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT 
THE APPELLEES MET THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 10-2-502.7(3)(a). (c)(i) AND (d) ELEMENTS WAS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
A. Standard of Review - The Marshaling Requirement 
The clearly erroneous standard of review applied to lower court factual findings is 
akin to the summary judgment standard of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. 
Both standards of review almost inevitably turn on "whether there was substantial evidence 
to support the outcome". See Jensen v Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 1 76, 130 P.2d 325, 340 (Utah 
2005) (factual issues submitted to a jury); Anderson v Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 
(1986) (on summary judgment, the plaintiff is not relieved of his burden of producing 
evidence that would support a jury verdict). Likewise, both standards of review have been 
phrased as whether reasonable minds could differ on the outcome. Jackson v Dabney, 645 
P.2d 613, 619 (Utah 1982) (summary judgment); Hardngv Bdl, 2002 UT 108, 114, 57 PJd 
1093 (jury verdict); Nash v Craig Cay Inc., 585 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1978) (jury factual 
question). Marshaling of the evidence is the judicial tool used to determine whether the 
outcome is supported by substantial evidence. In evaluating a summary judgment motion, it 
is not necessary to show that all facts on all questions are undisputed. Hegjar Ranch, 619 P.2d 
at 1390-92. It is sufficient to show that facts entitling a party to a judgment are not in 
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dispute. E.g. Sorensen v Beers, 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978). Or that reasonable minds 
cannot differ on the outcome. E.g. Jackson v Dabney, 645 P.2d at 615. Accordingly, when 
applying the clearly erroneous or substantial evidence standard to the review of a lower 
court's factual determination, it is sufficient to show (1) the undisputed facts are 
determinative, or (2) that reasonable minds cannot come to a contrary conclusion on the 
factual issue being reviewed. A disciplined marshaling of the evidence under the substantial 
evidence standard, as Bluffdale did in its opening brief, conclusively demonstrates that the 
lower court's ruling on the disconnection viability issue and increase municipal costs to 
Bluffdale issue are clearly each erroneous. 
B. Reasonable Minds Cannot Conclude the Disconnection is Viable. 
On page 17-19 of its opening brief, Bluffdale marshaled the viability evidence. South 
Farm's in-house engineer, South Hills' CEO, the developer's consulting engineer, and the 
developer's financial expert all testified that the disconnection was viable because it is raw 
land now requiring few services, and would be raw land immediately after the disconnection. 
The Appellees' addenda evidence, p. 1, second bullet; p. 14, second and third bullets; p. 16, 
fifth bullet; and p. 19, first bullet, contain the same or supplemental citations. Nothing was 
added to the marshaling process. As set forth in Bluff dale's opening brief, the evidence is 
insufficient because it is undisputed the land will be annexed and development commenced 
in Herriman City.6 Further, Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-408(3) mandates that Herriman cannot 
refuse the filed annexation petition (Exs. 90-92). Both developers testified about their 
Herriman development plans. & 1295 at 324; 152-153. Further, the uncontradicted 
6
 In his opening argument, Appellees' counsel in an exaggeration told the court that the land will remain in the County 
for "a few seconds" K 1295 at 22 4-6 
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documentary evidence, ie the only viability study ever done, Plaintiffs Ex. 130, and 
Herriman's budget documents show that Herriman will sustain a loss of $55 million, a loss 
that it cannot legally incur. Discredited testimony is not normally considered a sufficient 
basis for drawing a contrary conclusion. A nderson, Ml U.S. at 256. Consequently, no 
reasonable fact finder can conclude that the disconnection is viable. 
C Reasonable Minds Cannot Conclude That Municipal Costs to Service 
Bluffdale Will Not Increase. 
Again, on pages 20-21 of its opening brief, Bluffdale marshaled the Appellees' 
evidence. The same or similar evidence is restated in the Appellants' Brief addenda A, p. 14, 
third bullet; p. 17, first bullet; and p. 20, second bullet. Again, nothing is added to the 
marshaling process, and again, Bluffdale demonstrated in its opening brief why the evidence 
in support of the cost finding is not based on substantial evidence. 
POINT VI 
PORTIONS OF THE APPELLEES' BRIEF SHOULD BE IGNORED 
First, it was improper for the Appellees to enlarge the page limit of the brief by 
placing facts in addenda or appendices. SeeDebryv Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353, 1360 
n. 3 (Utah 1994). Next, the derogatory references, some examples of which are contained on 
page 6, lines 2-3; page 11, line 19; page 13, lines 14 and 18-20; have no place in an appellate 
brief. See also State v Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Application of the statutes presented in this appeal, to the disciplined marshaling of 
dispositive facts clearly show: (1) the lower court lacked jurisdiction; (2) private property 
owners have no right to change a common municipal boundary, (3) the proposed 
disconnection creates prohibited islands and peninsulas; (4) the lower court misapplied the 
justice and equity disconnection standard; and (5) and the lower court's findings on the 
viability of the disconnection and no increase in municipal costs to Bluffdale are clearly 
erroneous. For these compelling reasons, the disconnection decree entered by the lower 
court should be reversed and vacated. 
Dated this the day of October, 2006. 
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